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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature ofthe Case.

This is an appeal from the February 2,2009, trial court's order denying the Appellants'
(Brattons) Motion for New Trial. The trial commenced on September 3, 2008, and the final
verdict was in favor of the Brattons and was rendered on September 16, 2008. Thereafter,
Brattons moved for costs as a matter of right. The Scotts moved for JNOV, which, on
November 17, 2008, was granted. The Brattons subsequently moved for a new trial, which
motion was denied. The Scotts then moved for costs as a matter of right, discretionary costs, and
attorney fees, which all were granted in substantial part.
The underlying claim in this matter dealt with the destruction OfBrattons' 34-year-old
irrigation ditch created by an express irrigation easement. Along with acreage, an
easementlright-of-Way was conveyed to the Brattons by Harold and Janet Ford (Ford) in the
early spring of 1973, and because ofthe muddy condition of the servient property, the ditch
could not be dug until after the conveyance. As soon as the ground conditions pennitted, Ford
dug a three-foot-wide irrigation ditch and verbally allowed for a pennanent 12-foot
easementlright-of-Way. Brattons added a culvert at either end, as well as cement and galvanized
pipe to the ditch to preclude erosion. The Brattons used and maintained the ditch and right-ofway continually from 1973 to April Of2007.
In April 2007, the new owners ofthe servient estate, John and Jackie Scott (Scotts),

began interfering with the Brattons' use of their irrigation ditch. The Scotts were hostile to
Mr. Bratton, told him not to spray or bum the easement, not to come onto their property to access
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the easement or ditch, also placed no trespassing signs around the easement and ditch/canal
headgate, placed a perimeter rope fence containing "No Trespassing" signs, and destroyed the
ditch and piping.
The Brattons tried to negotiate with the Scotts and their attorney to have the Scotts stop
their interference and replace the ditch. Unfortunately, those negotiations were unsuccessful.

B.

Course of Proceedings.

On June 28, 2007, the Brattons filed a complaint for equitable and civil relief to have the
ditch replaced. R. Vol. I, pp. 1-17. The Brattons' equitable relief claim was never heard due to
the trial court's scheduling issues. The Brattons lost the irrigation season of 2007, and on
January 14,2008, filed an Amended Complaint. R. Vol. I, pp. 94-110. The trial date was set,
but vacated on two difference occasions at the request of the Scotts. Tr. Vol. I, p. 102, 1. 20 p. 103, 1. 20. A partial summary judgment was granted to the Brattons that provided a judgment
affirming the Brattons' express irrigation easement. Tr. Vol. I, p. 61, L1. 11-15. The trial
finally commenced on September 3, 2008. Tr. Vol. II, p. 292, L1. 1-10. At the time of the trial,
upon motion of the Brattons, the trial court took judicial notice of Idaho Code Sections 42-1101,

et seq. and 42-1201, et seq. Tr. Vol. II, p. 311,1. 2 - p. 312, 1. 18.
On the eve of trial and over the Brattons' objection, the trial court ordered that the trial be
trifurcated. Tr. Vol. I, p. 200, 1. 14 - p. 202, 1. 1. The first segment would deal with the
scope/width of the irrigation easementlright-of-way; the second segment would decide liability;
and the third segment would address damages. [d. The jury would be impaneled for ail three
segments, but would be advisory only as to the first segment. [d., p. 249, 1. 24 - p. 250, 1. 3;

2
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p. 252, LL. 8-11. The trial court emphasized more than once that if the jury did not find for the
Brattons on liability, then the damage segment would not be necessary. [d., p. 200, L. 14p. 202, L. 1. The jury would render three separate and distinct verdicts following each of the
three segments. [d.
In the first segment, the trial court, over objections and argument of the Brattons,
instructed the jury strictly according to the three elements of implied easement as set out in

Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 638, 432 P.3d 392,395 (2006). Tr. Vol. II,p. 311, L. 2P. 312, L. 18. The Brattons argued that the jury should be instructed pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 42-1102. Based on the Madsen instruction regarding implied easement, the jury found
there was no "Madsen defined" implied easement. R. Vol. III, pp. 355-56.
The second segment of the trial addressed liability. The jury unanimously found, in
pertinent part, that: the Scotts interfered with the Brattons' easement; the Scotts' interference was
a proximate cause of harm; the Scotts had changed the Brattons' ditch; and the Scotts did not
have written permission to change the ditch. R. Vol. III, pp. 387-91; Tr. Vol. IV, p. 1416, LL. 712; p. 1420, LL. 3-17.
The third segment addressed damages. Immediately prior to the third segment, the trial
court ruled that the Brattons could not address damage evidence including crop loss and the
consequences thereof because the jury had found there was no diminished flow. Tr. Vol. IV,
p. 1419, L. 4 -po 1420, L. 17. The Brattons' damage case had been prepared based upon Idaho
Code Sections 42-1102 and 42-1207 in that the destruction of the ditch and interference of the

3
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Scotts had caused injury to the Brattons' property activities conducted thereon. Id., p. 1412,
L. 23 -po 1415, L. 21; p. 1420, LL. 3-17.
The Brattons claimed the cost of constructing an underground irrigation system that
would essentially replace their 34-year-old system and allow avoidance of the ongoing
interference by the Scotts. Tr. Vol. III, p. 608, L. 20 - p. 609, L. 5. The jury had found
interference and that interference had caused harm to the Brattons. Id., p. 1396, LL. 1-18. The
trial court excluded evidence of a piped ditch, as well as the crop loss and consequences thereto
based on Idaho Code Section 42-1207. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 1412, L. 23 - p. 1415, L. 21; p. 1419, L. 4
- p. 1420, L. 17.
The trial court allowed the Brattons' irrigation expert to explain and illustrate
replacement of a fully aboveground ditch. Tf. Vol. IV, p. 1453, L. 12 - p. 1454, L. 12. That was
all the damage evidence allowed. Id. The jury verdict in the third segment was.in favor of the
Brattons in the amount of $6,500.00. R. Vol. III, pp. 451-53. Following the third verdict, the
Brattons filed a Motion for Costs, which was never heard. R. Vol. IV, pp. 563-67. The Scotts
then moved for a JNOV, which was granted. R. Vol. III, pp. 454-55. The Brattons subsequently
moved for a new trial, which was denied. R. Vol. IV, pp. 598c600; pp. 651-52. The Scotts filed
a motion for costs as a matter of right, discretionary costs, and attorney fees, which was granted
in substantial part. R. Vol. III, pp. 498-506; pp. 649-50. A Judgment was entered in favor of the
Scotts. R. Vol. IV, pp. 551-53. The Brattons filed this timely appeal. R. Vol. IV, pp. 655-59.

4
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C.

Statement of Facts.

In 1973, Ford owned and subsequently divided a tract ofland that became the Canyon
County Fruitdale Farm Subdivision. Def. Tr. Ex. A; Tr. Vol. II, p. 414, L. 9 - p. 426, L. 8. In
doing so, among other divisions, Ford created two adjoining lots, lots number 32 and 40. [d. On
April 19, 1973, Ford conveyed 32 to the Brattons byway ofa Warranty Deed (dominant estate).
[d.

The Warranty Deed from Ford to the Brattons included a one-half share of water stock
held in the Canyon Hill Ditch Company and another one-half share of stock held in Middleton
Mill Ditch Company. [d. In addition, the Warranty Deed gave an express easement for the
construction of a three-foot-wide irrigation ditch, maintenance, as well as rights of ingress and
egress onto lot 40 (servient estate). [d. The ditch was constructed by Ford as soon as the springtime ground condition allowed use of a tractor and "V" illtcher. Tr. Vol. II, p. 427, LL. 2-15;
p. 441, L. 20 - p. 447 L. 7. The deed reads in pertinent part:
[Aln easement along the boundary line between Lots 39 and 40 of FRUITDALE
FARM SUBDIVISION, Section 3, Township 4 North, Range 3 West, Boise
Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, 3 feet in width and of a length of approximately
200 yards along said boundary line between Lots 39 and 40 for the construction
and maintenance of an irrigation ditch and for ingress and egress along said ditch
boundary line.
Def. Tr. Ex. A; Tr. Vol. II, p. 425, L. 12 - p. 426, L. 2.

In addition to the express deed, Ford orally and by conduct permanently enlarged the
easement to 12 feet, which in 2008, Ford testified had been in place since 1973. Tr. Vol. II,
p. 425, L. 12 - p. 427, L. 15; p. 459, L. 18 - p. 460, L. 24.

5
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The three-foot-wide irrigation ditch traversed lot 40 and was specifically located far
enough away from the fence constructed between lots 39 and 40. This placement ofthe ditch
was to protect the integrity of the fence and to allow for installation and maintenance ofthe
ditch. Tr. Vol. II, p. 427, LL. 2-15; p. 453, L1. 16-22. The easement allowed irrigation to the
dominant estate, lot 32, which without the ditch would have been landlocked. Id., p. 456, 1. 21 p. 457, 1. 23. Because the servient property had a downward drop and westerly slope, the
Brattons tiled sections of the irrigation ditch in concrete and galvanized pipe in order to prevent
erosion and to also control water flow and volume. Id., p. 444, L1. 18-25; p. 445, 1. 13 - p. 447,
1. 16.
After the ditch was constructed, the Brattons began their irrigation and corresponding
ditch maintenance. !d., p. 441, LL. 13-23; p. 454, L1. 19-23; p. 456, LL. 21- 24. Ford, upon
agreement with the Brattons, also used the Brattons' ditch for irrigation of a portion of lot 40, the
servient estate. Id., p. 422, L1. 11-19; p. 442, L1. 9-14. Since 1973 and up to 2007, the Brattons
enjoyed the use of their ditch and maintained the ditch, depositing dredged spoils adjacent to the
ditch. !d., p. 470, L1. 1-5; p. 478, 1. 22 - p. 479, L. 15. The Brattons' use and maintenance of
the ditch and corresponding ditch easement involved use of a tractor with a "V" ditcher to clean
the ditch and to deposit spoils along the ditch banks, the spraying and burning of weeds, and for
ingress and egress for irrigation and ditch equipment. Id., p. 470, L1. 1-10. The maintenance,
ingress, and egress required a 12-foot easement. Id., p. 425, 1. 12 - p. 426, 1. 8.
On January 2, 1996, Ford signed a Quitclaim Deed for lot 40 (servient estate) to Lois
Rawlinson (Rawlinson). After the 1996 Quitclaim Deed, the Brattons continued the use,

6
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enjoyment, and maintenance of their irrigation ditch and its underlying easement. On
September 13, 2005, Rawlinson gift-deeded lot 40 (servient easement) to the Scotts. PI. Trial

Ex. 9; id., p. 462, L. 20 - p. 464, L. 1. This gift deed specifically stated, in pertinent part, that the
Scotts take the property:
together with all tenements, hereditaments, water, water rights, ditches, ditch
rights, easements and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise
appertaining, and subject to any encumbrances or easements as appear of record
or by use upon such property.
[d. (emphasis added).

In April 2007, Mr. Bratton followed his normal routine to prepare to receive water for the
upcoming irrigation season, by spraying the ditch and easement for weeds. Tr. Vol. II, p. 455,
LL. 9-18; Tr. Vol. III, p. 939, L. 17 - p. 940, L. 10. Once the weeds died, as was also his
routine, Mr. Bratton accessed his easement and began to bum the dried weeds. [d., Tr. Vol. II,
p. 455, L. 19 - p. 456, L. 11; Tr. Vol. III, id. During the burning process, the Scotts approached
Mr. Bratton in a hostile manner and demanded that he stop burning, that he never again spray or
bum the easement, and that he leave the servient property. Tr. Vol. III, p. 941, L. 8 - p. 942,
L. 17; id., p. 943, LL. 12-21. During the trial, the Scotts agreed that they approached
Mr. Bratton and told him not to bum or spray the irrigation ditch or the area adjacent thereto.

!d., p. 863, L. 23 - p. 864, L. 11.
Within days of the above encounter, the Scotts placed "No Trespassing" signs on the
boundary line between lots 32 (dominant estate) and 40 (servient estate) at the point ofthe
Brattons'ingress. Tr. Vol. III, p. 966, LL. 1-23. The Scotts also placed "No Trespassing" signs
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near Brattons' canal headgate. [d. On a second encounter, the Scotts acted in a hostile manner
to prevent Mr. Bratton from ingress of his easement. [d., p. 951, L. 16 - p. 952, L. 12.

Mr. Bratton was just beginning to go onto his easement when Mr. Scott came running after him
and shouting at Bratton. [d., p. 941, L. 11 - p. 942, L. 11. Mr. Bratton backed away from the
easement and did not access water. [d.,p. 943, LL.12-21;p. 951, L.16-p. 952, L.12. Soon
thereafter, when Mr. Bratton was away from his property, and without permission from the
Brattons, the Scotts leveled the 34-year-old ditch, destroyed the galvanized pipe, and removed
the cement piping. [d., p. 883, LL. 18-23; p. 953, L. 5 - p. 954, L. 1. After the ditch was
destroyed, Mr. Bratton called the police and unsuccessfully attempted, via negotiations, to
require the Scotts to replace the 34-year-old ditch, piping, and to stop interfering with the
easement. [d., p. 947, LL. 5-7; p. 954, LL. 5-13. The Brattons also tried, without success, to
mediate the issue through counsel. [d., p. 956, L 17 - p. 957, L. 12.
The Brattons were without irrigation water during the 2007 and 2008 irrigation seasons
because of the destruction oftheir ditch and because of repeated interference by the Scotts. !d.,
p. 996, LL. 9-24.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review.

This appeal addresses the trial court's grant of Scotts' motion for judgment n.o.v., as well
as the trial court's denial of the Brattons' Motion for New Trial. On appeal of a motion for
judgment n.o. v. and a motion for new trial, the appellate court applies distinct standards for each.
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The standard of review for a judgment n.o.v. is a question of law and has been articulated by this
Court:
In detel1llining whether a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. should have
been granted, the appellate court applies the same standard as does the trial court
which passed on the motion originally.

Quickv. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727P.2d 1187(1986).
In contrast, the appellate standard of review for new trial addresses the question of
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. This Court has set forth the
review standard as follows:
On appeal, we [the Supreme Court] will not reverse a trial court's order granting
or denying a motion for new trial "unless the court has manifestly abused the wide
discretion vested in it." [Citation omitted.] "While we [the Supreme Court] must
review the evidence, we are not in a position to 'weigh' it as the trial court."

Jones v. Panhandle Distribs., Inc., 117 Idaho 750, 792 P.2d 315 (1990).
B.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Rnling in Favor of the Scotts'
Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict as to the Verdict for
Damages.

The Scotts' motion for judgment n.o.v. involved only the verdict in the third segment,
damages. As stated, supra, the function ofI.R.C.P. 50(b) is "to give the trial court the last
opportunity to order the judgment that the law reqnires." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764,
727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). In detel1llining whether a judgment not withstanding the verdict
should have been granted, the Idaho Appellate Court applies "the same standard as does the trial
court ..... " Quick, 111 Idaho at 763,727 P.2d at 1191. The question of whether a verdict
should have been directed "is purely a question of law," and in such matters, the "parties are
entitled to a full review by the appellate court without special deference to the views of the trial
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court." ld. at 764. This court is obligated to review the record ofthe trial below and determine if
there was "substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury." ld. The question is
"not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is
made, but whether there is substantial evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict
for that party." Quick, 111 Idaho at 773, citation omitted.

1.

Damage verdict.

In moving for judgment not withstanding the verdict, the movant admits the truth of the
adversary's evidence and every legitimate inference that could be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., id., Quick at 763, and Smith v. Big Lost River
Irrigation Dist., 83 Idaho 374, 391 (1961). Therefore, the trial judge is not permitted to weigh
the evidence or pass on the credibility of the witnesses and make his or her own separate findings
of fact for comparison with those of the jury. ld., Quick at 763 (citation omitted, emphasis
added). Moreover, the trial court should not take a case from the jury unless, as a matter oflaw,
no recovery could be had upon any view which properly could be taken of the evidence. Smith,
83 Idaho at 391, citing Stearns v. Graves, 62 Idaho 312 (1941). This is particularly true of
motions implicating findings of proximate cause. Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 107
Idaho 701, 704 (1984) (citation omitted, emphasis added). As is of record, the second verdict on
proximate cause was a unanimous verdict, which allowed the trial to commence to the third
segment on damages. The Brattons prevailed as to the verdict on damages.
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2.

Jury's common knowledge.

In this matter, the jury was well versed in irrigation ditches and the costs associated. As
the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have both confirmed, it is the very
nature of the jury process for jurors to bring with them into the jury room their general life
experiences, and a sense of what is .and is not reasonable in light of those experiences and in light
of the facts before them. See Quick, III Idaho at 765; see also Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho
887,890 (Ct. App. 1988). Consequently, when considering trial evidence and reaching a verdict,
jurors are permitted and expected to take into account matters of common knowledge and
experience. State v. Espinoza, 133 Idaho 618, 622 (Ct. App. 1999). In other words, in this
matter, the members ofthis jury, when reaching a verdict, are permitted to apply their own
experience and their own common knowledge.
Damage awards, particularly damage awards in tort actions, are primarily a question for
the jury. See Gonzales v. Hodson, 91 Idaho 330, 334 (1966); see also Bentzinger v. McMurtrey,
100 Idaho 273, 274 (1979).
This is because "[ d]amages are susceptible to proof only with an approximation of

certainty . ... " See Shrum v. Wakimoto, 70 Idaho 252, 256 (1950) (citation omitted, emphasis
added); see also Gonzales and Bentzinger, supra. As a result, it is solely for the jury to estimate
damages as best they can by reasonable probabilities, and based upon their sound judgment as to
what would be just and proper under all of the circumstances. Shrum, 70 Idaho at 256, quoting

Gorton v. Doty, 57 Idaho 792 (1937). Jury verdicts are not to be disturbed absent a showing of
bias or prejudice. Jd. (emphasis added).
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In this matter, during voir dire, the trial court learned that the jury was very versed in
water rights, ditches, pastures, hay, etc. Juror Number 540 had experience driving large
equipment, digging ditches, and laying pipe; Juror Number 542 had experience with irrigation,
driving large equipment, digging ditches, and laying pipe, experience with plants and weeds in
Idaho, owned rural property, and owned horses; Juror Number 544 had experience driving large
equipment and owned rural property; Juror Number 548 had experience driving large equipment
and had owned horses; Juror Number 549 had experience with irrigation, pastures, and hay,
owning acreage, driving large equipment, digging ditches and laying pipe, and owned horses and
livestock; Juror Number 557 owned rural property; Juror Number 559 had experience driving
large equipment and owned rural property; Juror Number 572 had experience driving large
equipment, digging ditches, laying pipe, and owned rural property; and Juror Number 586 had
experience driving large equipment, had been involved in property disputes, and owned rural
acreage and horses. Based on the collective common experience of the jury, even though the
trial court excluded the cost ofthe ditch and pipe replacement, this jury used that collection of
common experience to arrive at a reasonable verdict based on what evidence the trial court did
allow.

3.

The district court erred by not following law ofthe state ofIdaho as
set forth by Idaho Code Sections 42-1101, et seq. and 42-1201, et seq.
a.

Notice pleading.

Importantly, the IdahoRules of Civil Procedure establish a system of notice pleading.
Under this system of pleading, a plaintiff does not need to include a great deal of particularity in
a complaint. Rather, a plaintiff only needs to allege facts and claims sufficient for a defendant to
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understand the claim that has been alleged against them. See Cookv. Skyline Corp.,·135 Idaho
26, 34, 13 P.3d 857, 865 (2000). Discussing Idaho's notice pleading requirements, the court in
Cook, supra, stated, "[nJotice pleading frees the parties from pleading particular issues or

theories, and allows parties to get through the courthouse door by merely stating claims upon
which relief can be granted." Id.
More recently, this Court in Vendelin v. Costeo Wholesale Corp., 104 Idaho 416, 427,95
P.3d 34, 45 (2004), stated: "With the advent of notice pleading, a party is no longer slavishly
bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings. Rather, a complaint need only state claims
upon which relief may be granted.... The emphasis ... is to insure that a just result is
accomplished, rather than requiring strict adherence to rigid forms ofpleading." (Emphasis
added.)
In this case, the Complaint and Amended Complaint set forth the facts that: (I) the
Brattons' ditch had been a long-standing irrigation ditch that was open and obvious; (2) that the
Scotts knew ofthe ditch; (3) that the ditch was unilaterally obliterated by the Scotts; (4) that the
corresponding irrigation easement and right-of-way measured 12 feet wide; (5) that the Scotts
were put on notice of the Brattons' ditch by their Gift Deed; (6) that the Scotts had observed

Mr. Bratton using the ditch;

atlP (7) that the Scotts repeatedly interfered with the Brattons' use of

the ditch and its corresponding easement, which interference and ditch obliteration damaged the
Brattons. Therefore, the Brattons satisfied the requirements of notice pleading. The Scotts and
the trial court were well apprised of the claims to insure that a just result could be accomplished.
Further, each of the enumerated facts were proven at trial during the first trial segment.
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b.

Idaho Code Title 42.

In recognizing the importance that water and irrigation play in Idaho, the legislatnre has
enacted specific legislation regarding irrigation and water rights. Various statutes set forth the
applicable law in both the scope and governance of such rights.
The Idaho Legislatnre recognized that a ditch owner must be permitted to clean,
maintain, and repair a ditch or canal. 1 Idaho Code Section 42- I 102 expressly grants to an
irrigation easement a right-of-way so that irrigation ditch owners can "properly do the work of

cleaning, maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or conduit with personnel and with such
equipment as is commonly used, or reasonably adapted, to that work." Id. (emphasis added).
Recognizing the importance of cleaning and maintaining a ditch, Idaho Code Section 42- I 102
further states that a ditch owner is permitted sufficient width to properly effect the necessary
cleaning, maintenance, or repairs. This section is set forth:

Idaho law does not expressly define the term "ditch owner." However, Idaho case law
implies that a ditch owner is an individual or entity with an interest in the water of a particular
ditch or canal. Camp v. E. Fork Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 857, 55 P.3d 304, 3 I 1 (2002) (citing
Reynolds Irrigation Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1948)). As a ditch owner, an
individual or entity is entitled to an easement across the land of others to transport its irrigation
water. Ramseyer v. Jamerson, 78 Idaho 504, 511, 305 P.2d 1088, 1093 (1957). The Supreme
Court of Idaho has provided that "[ilt is well established in this jurisdiction that an easement is
the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general
use ofthe property by the owner." Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 549-50,
808 P.2d 1289, 1294-95 (1991) (citing Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 365 P.2d 952 (1961)).
A ditch owner also has a "secondary easement with rights of ingress and egress for the purpose
of maintenance ... and the regnlation of his water." Ramseyer, 78 Idaho at 511, 305 P.2d at
1093. The "cleaning, maintaining, and repairing" of a canal or ditch to ensnre the proper
transportation of water is considered within the scope of a maintenance easement. Nampa &
Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Wash. Fed. Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001); see also IDAHO
CODE § 42-11 02.
1
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The right of way shall include ... the right to ... occupy such width ofthe load
along the banks of the ditch. .. as is necessary ... .
IDAHO CODE § 42-1102.
The statutory irrigation easement and right-of-way granted by Idaho Code
Section 42-1102 is crucial (or, in the parlance of the statute itself, is "essentiaf') to water users
given the express duties and liabilities that Idaho Code Title 42, Chapter 12 imposes upon those
who own, construct, and/or control irrigation works. For example, Idaho Code Sections 42-1202
and 42-1203 mandate maintenance of a ditch and ditch embankments for the delivery of water,
particularly to prevent the "useless discharge and running away ofwater.".See IDAHO CODE

§ 42-1203. Moreover, Idaho Code Section 42-1204 obligates ditch owners and constructors to
operate and maintain their irrigation works in such a manner so as not to damage or injure the
property or premises of others; the failure to properly do so resulting in liability for the ditch
owner for the damage/harm caused to others. ld. See also IDAHO CODE § 42-1102. These
statutorily imposed duties and liabilities are why the mere existence of a ditch gives rise to the
equally necessary corresponding irrigation easement and right-of-way. See IDAHO CODE

§ 42-1102 ("The existence of a visible ditch ... shall constitute notice to the ... servient estate,
that the owner of the ditch ... has the right-of-way ... granted by this section."). Without such a
corresponding irrigation easement or right-of-way, ditch owners would have no way of meeting
the obligations or mitigating the liabilities imposed by Idaho Code Sections 42-1201 through
42-1204.
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Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 42-1102, an easement for an irrigation ditch allows for
enough room on each side of the ditch to maintain the ditch, and allows for the ingress and
egress of machinery or equipment customarily used or adapted for that maintenance. The
evidence at trial proved that while the Brattons' ditch was itself was only three feet in width, the
historic, usual, and customary maintenance of the ditch (via the use of a tractor and a ditcher)
required at least 12 feet in total width from the bank ofthe ditch, so as not to harm a third party's
boundary fence. The Brattons further proved that the servient estate owner at the time the ditch
was constructed (Ford in 1973) granted the Brattons a 12-foot irrigation easement recognizing
these maintenance needs.

c;

The trial court erroneously barred Idaho Cod~ Section
42-1102.

The trial court erroneously ruled that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 granted an irrigation
easement or right-of-way only to those water users whose property was riparian (i.e., possessing
frontage on a natural stream). However, the plain and unambiguous language ofIdaho Code
Section 42-1102 makes clear that the statute provides a private right of eminent domain for
irrigation purposes beyond those factual scenarios involving only riparian parcels abutting

natural streams. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 provides, in pertinent part:
When any such owners or claimants to land have not sufficient length of frontage
on a stream to afford the requisite fall for a ditch ... on their own premises forthe
proper irrigation thereof, !!I. where the land proposed to be irrigated is back from
the banks of such stream, and convenient facilities otherwise for the watering of
said lands cannot be had, such owners or claimants are entitled to a right-of-way
through the lands of others, for the purposes of irrigation.
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See IDAHO CODE § 42-1102 (emphasis added). Thus, Idaho Code Section 42-1102 applies to at
least TWO different scenarios, as illustrated by the statute's use of the disjunctive term "or." The
statute applies when: (1) riparian property owners lack sufficient stream frontage to afford the
requisite fall for a ditch; OR (2) when the land proposed to be irrigated is back from the banks

of such stream. The Brattons irrigate lands that are set back from the nearest natural stream
serving as the source of their water rights (the Boise River in this instance). Consequently, the
Brattons' parcel is not riparian. However, Idaho Code Section 42-1102 still grants the Brattons
an irrigation easement and right-of-way as the owners ofland susceptible to irrigation, even
though that land is "back from the banks" of the Boise River.
Put bluntly, the trial court's holding that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 grants irrigation
easements and rights-of-way only to riparian landowners is proven wrong by two simple
observations: (1) Idaho common law abolished the riparian rights doctrine over a century ago

(see, e.g., Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484, 491 (1909»; and (2) hundreds
of thousands of acres of ground in Idaho are irrigated within the boundaries of irrigation districts
and canal companies whose lands are not riparian to the source (river) of water supplying the
water rights used; a system of irrigation that would not exist if Idaho Code Section 42-1102 did
not grant easement and right-of-ways for landlocked parcels of property.
Moreover, and despite the trial court's ruling, the Brattons' interpretation ofIdaho Code
Section 42-1102, and its application to the factual scenario presented in their Complaint, directly
squares with Idaho Supreme Court authority interpreting the statute in the very same manner.

See, e.g., Canyon View Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 607 (1980) ("In
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order to assist owners of water rights whose lands are remote from the water source, the state
has partially delegated its powers of eminent domain to private individuals ... [IDAHO CODE
§§ 42-1102 and 42-1106] permit landlocked individuals to condenm a right-of-way through the
lands of others for purposes of irrigation."). Id. (emphasis added).'

d.

Case law does not bar Idaho Code Section 42-1102.

The trial court cited Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District v. Washington Federal

Savings, 135 Idaho 518 (2001), as dispositive in this matter because it involved the interpretation
and the application of an express written easement and its juxtaposition and competition with the
provisions of Idaho Code Section 42-1102. However, this Court's decision in Washington

Federal Savings was not predicated upon a general finding that a written express easement
trumps the application ofIdaho Code Section 42-1102. Instead, this Court declined to apply the
statute in the overly-expansive manner as argued by the Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District.
In Washington Federal Savings, the Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District attempted to
prohibit Washington Federal Bank's construction of a fence and a sidewalk within the easement
2 In a perplexing tum of events later in the proceedings, the trial court subsequently
decided that the Brattons' parcel was riparian due to its relationship with the artificial, manmade irrigation ditch serving the property. Therefore, and according to the trial court, the
Brattons' parcel was not "landlocked," and for that reason the Brattons could not avail
themselves of the irrigation easementlright-of-way rights granted by Idaho Code
Section 42-1102, and as confirmed in Canyon View Irrigation Co., supra. Needless to say, the
Brattons' parcel is not riparian to the source of their water rights (the Boise River), or any other
natural stream for that matter. Artificial irrigation works do not create riparian land. Instead, the
mere existence of the Brattons' ditch, and the existence of the larger system of interconnected
canals and ditches that deliver the Brattons' irrigation water to their ditch, demonstrates that the
Brattons' parcel is not riparian. Said delivery canals and.ditches are necessary for water delivery
to the Brattons' parcel because the parcel is landlocked and not susceptible to irrigation by any
other means.
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and right-of-way for the Finch Lateral. Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District argued, in part,
that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 granted the district an exclusive irrigation easement from
which it could exclude others, including underlying fee title land owners. Id. at 521. Rather than
holding that the express channel change easement agreement at issue trumped the application of
Idaho Code Section 42-1102 for purposes of defining the scope of the Finch Lateral easement,
this Court read the express easement agreement in harmony with Idaho Code Section 42-1102,
holding that both the irrigation district and the bank possessed rights under the statute. Id. This
Court held that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 granted the Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District
a non-exclusive irrigation easement for the Finch Lateral, and that the bank was correspondingly
entitled to use its property in any manner that did not interfere with the purposes and scope of the
subject irrigation easement. Id.
In sum, this Court held that the irrigation district attempted to use Idaho Code

Section 42-1102 in an impermissibly expansive manner, a manner that would have required the
Court to find that the district's irrigation easement and right-of-way was exclusive, and that the
statute op'erated to bar Washington Federal's fence and sidewalk for public safety reasons.
Understandably, this Court was not willing to reach that result because the plain language of
Idaho Code Section 42-1102 does not give rise to an "exclusive" irrigation easement or right-ofway, nor does the statute expressly contemplate the prohibition of encroachments for "public
safety" reasons. Id. at 523-24. Of importance to this case, however, is the fact that this Court
did not hold, as did the trial court, that an express easement trumps, and therefore bars, the
consideration and application ofIdaho Code Section 42-1102.
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In the case at bar, the Brattons are seeking nothing more than the irrigation easement and
right-of-way that was granted to them by the servient estate and further granted and confinned
by Idaho Code Section 42-11 02. The Brattons are not claiming that their irrigation easement and
right-of-way is exclusive, and they are not trying to expand the purposes for which the easement
exists. Instead, the Brattons are merely seeking the same 12-foot irrigation easement and rightof-way they have always had, which allows them to operate and maintain the ditch in the same
reasonable and customary manner that they have done for over the last 34 years (namely, with a
tractor and a V ditcher-equipmeht commonly used and reasonably adapted for those operation
and maintenance purposes).
The bottom line for consideration in this matter is that the Brattons' irrigation easement
and right-of-way preexisted the Scotts' ownership of their property. The Scotts took ownership
.of the servient property subject to that preexisting irrigation easement and right-of-way. While
the Scotts are free to use their property in any manner that does not interfere with the purposes
and scope for which the Brattons' irrigation easement and right-of-way was created, the Scotts
absolutely may not interfere with the right, destroy the existing ditch, or otherwise act to rescind
the dominant irrigation easement.
The Brattons rightfully possess those rights expressly granted to them in 1973 by the
servient property owner (Ford), and those concurrent rights and obligations granted and
prescribed by Idaho Code Title 42, Chapters 11 and 12. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 expressly
,
grants the Brattons a reasonable width of land for the continued operation and maintenance of
the irrigation ditch that the parties all agree: (1) belonged to the Brattons; and (2) was
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constructed to serve the Brattons' parcel. The Brattons are not seeking to increase any burden
upon the servient estate. The Scotts' property has been "burdened" by the use of a l2-foot
irrigation easement and right-of-way since 1973. That "burden" was accepted and
acknowledged by the Scotts' predecessors-in-interest, including the unified parcel owner,

Mr. Ford, who conveyed the easement to the Brattons in 1973. The Brattons are simply seeking
to maintain the status quo, a status quo that the Scotts had no right to obliterate. See IDAHO
CODE § 42-1102; Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Wash. Fed. Sav., 135 Idaho 518 (2001);
IDAHO CODE § 42-1207; and Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at Ex. C (wherein
the Gift Deed that conveyed the subject property to the Scotts expressly provided that the Scotts
were taking ownership of the property "subject to any encumbrances or easements as appear of
record or by use upon such property." (emphasis added)).

e.

New title re: common law implied easement.

Even ifthe trial court required that the Brattons prove common law implied easement,
inclement weather delayed placement of the ditch until after the conveyance ofthe dominant
property. There is ample authority in Idaho to allow that under that set of facts, the easement
was implied by prior use. Phillips Industries, Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 699, 827 P.2d 706,
711 (Ct. App. 1992), states that apparent continuous use is not required prior to the separation of
the estates. See also Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d 403,407 (1961).
Again, even ifthe trial court disregarded the evidence that a 12-foot easement was
conveyed in 1973, the Brattons proved that the easement was "intended to be permanent."
Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 658, 132 P.3d 392, 395 (2006). Accordingly, the creation of
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an implied easement may be inferred "through the presumed intent of the parties based upon the
circumstances of separation ofland formerly under one ownership ... or inferred often
fictitiously through long continued use of the easement." Schultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773,
554P.2d 948, 952 (1976) (citing THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 351 (1961».
Necessity is also an element of an implied easement by prior use. However, the necessity
is "reasonable necessity" rather than "great present necessity." Id. at 773. Therefore, the
Brattons need only show that the easement by prior use was reasonably necessary at the time of

severance. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 643, 991 P.2d 362 (1999) (emphasis added).
Even the location of an express easement depends upon the intention of the parties and
the circumstances at the time the easement was given, and then carried out. Bedke v. Pickett

Ranch & Sheep Co., 143 Idaho 36, 39, 137 P.3d 423, 426 (2006). When the parties take
affirmative. steps to place appurtenances on the easement at the time it is granted or reserved,
their actions in so doing constitute an expression of their intent with respect to the scope and
location of that easement. See Bedke, 143 Idaho at 39; Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 129
P.3d 1223 (2006). Here, Ford testified that he granted a permanent 12-foot easement. The trial
evidence showed that the full 12-foot easement was continuously used for a period of no less
than thirty-four (34) years, that use of the full 12 feet was reasonably necessary in order to allow
use and maintenance ofthe irrigation ditch easement, and that appurtenances were placed
(galvanized and cement pipe).
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f.

Excluding Idaho Code Section 42-1102 was error.

The trial court omitted Idaho Code Section 42-1102 from the jury instructions on the
grounds that Idaho Code Section 42-1207 contained the necessary rule of law. Not all of the
germane concepts set forth within Idaho Code Section 42-1102 are incorporated into Idaho Code
Section 42-1207. While both Idaho Code Sections 42-1102 and 42-1207 address the rights and
obligations of ditch owners and servient landowners, only Idaho Code Section 42-1102
specifical1y addresses the creation, nature, and scope ofthe irrigation easements and rights-ofway underlying irrigation ditches.
The statutes found within Chapters 11 and 12 of Title 42, Idaho Code, are not mutual1y
exclusive. Instead, the statutes build upon one another. The fact that statutes are to be read in

pari mat(!ria is a wel1-settled canon of statutory construction. &(!, e.g., State v. Yager, 139 Idaho
680, 690 (2004). Unfortunately, the trial court ignored this fundamental concept by
impermissibly reading these statutes in a vacuum. Consequently, the trial court's barring of the
application of Idaho Code Section 42-1102 to the consideration of this matter unfairly prejudiced
the Brattons. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that statutes that are in pari

materia are to be construed together, to the end that the legislative intent wil1 be given effect.
For example, Idaho Code Sections 42-1204 and 42-1207 speak only in terms of the
existing irrigation easement or right-of way, the protection of that easement and right-of-way,
and the corresponding facility which the underlying easement and right-of way serves. Those
statutes do not speak in terms of the initial creation and necessity of the underlying irrigation
easement and right-of-way. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 not only contemplates the operation
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and maintenance needs for an irrigation easement and right-of-way, but also sets out the reasons
for which the easement and right-of-way were created; i.e., the requisite irrigation easement and
right-of way is created in order to assist those landowners in conveying their water rights to their
landlocked properties. This is a factual element which was central to the consideration of this
case. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 sets forth the reason why the Brattons need an irrigation
easement and right-of-way, and said statute (in conjunction with Idaho Code Section 42-1207)
,sets forth what rights the Brattons possess in relation to any servient landowners (the Scotts, in
this case).
Additionally, another key componentto this case, and a concept that is only provided for
in Idaho Code Section 42-1102, is the ''notice concept"-the fact that the mere existence of an
open and visible ditch and/or corresponding irrigation infrastructure located on the surface ofthe
ground put the Scotts on notice that the ditch possesses a corresponding irrigation easement and
right-of-way across the Scotts' property. Idaho Code Section 42-1102's visibility component
sets forth the notice that there is an "essential" right ofthe dominant estate to operate and
maintain the irrigation ditch, and that the Scotts were not permitted to interfere with the use and
enjoyment of that dominant estate irrigation easement and right-of-way. See IDAHO CODE
§§ 42-1102 and 42-1207. In this matter, the Scotts admitted that before they interfered with the
easement and destroyed the ditch, they affirmatively knew that the irrigation ditch existed, and
that the ditch was maintained and used by the Brattons to irrigate their property. Thus, the
Scotts' actions in interfering with the Brattons' use of their irrigation easement, and the Scotts'
obliteration of the Brattons' irrigation ditch absent the Brattons' prior written permission,
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violated the plain and unambiguous tenns ofIdaho Code Sections 42-1102 and 42-1207, among
others. As discussed herein, the trial court inexplicably erred in excluding the proper
consideration of both statutes in this matter.

g.

Implied easement by operation of law.

The facts regarding the ditch and easement's prior use are not in dispute. Idaho law
recognizes that implied easements may be created by prior use. See Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho
637,643,991 P.2d 362,368 (1999); Phillips Indus., Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 699, 827
P.2d 706,711 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992). Idaho recognizes two distinct methods for establishing an
implied easement. The first is set forth in Davis, 133 Idaho at 643, 991 P.2d at 368, which
reqUIres:
(1) unity of title or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant
estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant
estate to show that the use was intended to be pennanent; and (3) the easement
must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment ofthe dominant estate.

!d. at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. The second method was first promulgated in Davis v. Gowen, 83
Idaho 204, 360 P.2d 403 (1961), and requires:
(1) unity oftitle or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant
estate; (2) apparent continuous user; [and] (3) the easement must be reasonably
necessary to the proper enjoyment ofthe dominant estate.
Id. at 210,991 P.2d at 407 (emphasis added). The Davis v. Gowen method was favorably cited

in Davis v. Peacock and remains valid authority today. See Close v. Rensink, 95 Idaho 72, 501
P.2d 1383 (1972); Phillips Indus., Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 699, 827 P.2d 706,711 (Ct.
App. 1992). In fact, several courts have recognized the validity of the Gowen language in
detennining the existence of an implied easement. Id. In Close, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
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"[ eJven though the phraseology of the requirements as set out in Davis v. Gowen, ... is
somewhat different ... the same principles are involved." Close, 95 Idaho at 76, 501 P.2d at
1387 (emphasis added). See also Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 554 P.2d 948 (1976).
As this Court has made clear, it is the second prong of the Davis v. Peacock holding: I.e.,

(2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show
that the use was intended to be permanent, that has caused the Court to question the basis of .
implied easement. Under the Davis v. Gowen method of determining an implied easement, the
Brattons have continuously used the ditch and associated easement since 1973.
Further, it is iJ;nportant to note one difference between an implied easemen,t for irrigation

systems and those for other reasons. In Abbott v. Nampa School District No. 131,119 Idaho 544,
808 P.2d 1289 (1991), the Court recognized that a ditch easement necessarily includes the
applicable state law, such as the explicit requirement for a ditch owner to maintain .and clean
their ditch and ditch embankments. As such, when considering an irrigation easement, as here,
regard for applicable statutory provisions must be given. Conversely, in Peacock, the case
revolves around a road easement, not an irrigation system. The reason that the distinction is so
important is because there are specific statutory protections for irrigation systems, which statutes
do not apply to other easements. Due to the protective statutes for irrigation systems, the
Brattons demonstrated a valid implied easement or right-of-way by operation of law.
h.

The Scotts had written and actnal notice.

Additionally, the Scotts' Gift Deed must be considered. Idaho law has created a statutory
implied easement where a purchaser ofland has notice of a ditch:
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The existence of a visible ditch, canal or conduit shall constitute notice to the
owner, or any subsequent purchaser, of the underlying servient estate, that the
owner ofthe ditch, canal or conduit has the right-of-way and incidental rights
confirmed or granted by this section.
IDAHO CODE

§ 42-1102.

In 2005, when the Gift Deed conveyed the property to the Scotts, the facts are

uncontested that the ditch was in plain sight, open, and in obvious use. In fact, prior to 2007,
John Scott watched Mr. Bratton irrigate and use the ditch. In 2007 the Scotts: (I) threatened
Mr. Bratton while he was cleaning and maintaining his ditch; (2) placed No Trespassing signs;
(3) continued to threaten Mr. Bratton when he tried to irrigate; (4) destroyed the ditch; and then
(5) placed yellow rope containing the "No Trespassing" signs. Mr. Bratton asked the Scotts to
replace the ditch in its original location and configuration. The Scotts refused. Only then did the
Brattons seek judicial intervention.
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 42-1102, where a subsequent purchaser of the servient
estate can visibly identifY the ditch, the visible nature of the ditch is sufficient notice to inform
the purchaser of the easement. In this case, prior to 2007, the Scotts admitted the ditch was
visible and that the Brattons had been using the ditch for irrigation for that same period. Based
on the visible nature of the ditch and their knowledge that the Brattons used the ditch for
irrigation, the Scotts had been on notice ofthe ditch and all incidental rights associated therewith
as set forth by the statutes preViously discussed herein.
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The Scotts' Gift Deed further confinns the existence ofthe implied easement. As
mentioned, the deed contains the following language infonning the Scotts that their property was
subjected to certain encumbrances and easements:
The following described premises, to-wit:

together with all tenements, hereditaments, water, water rights, ditches, ditch
rights, easements and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise
appertaining, and subject to any encumbrances or easements as appear of record
or by use upon such property.
(Emphasis added). PI. Trial Ex. 9. Tr. Vol. II, P. 462, L. 20 - p. 464, L. 1. TheScotts had
notice ofthe existing ditch and easement by way of its visible nature and use, which is buttressed
by the language contained within their Gift Deed.
i.

The court misapplied Idaho Code Section 42-1207 in awarding

aJNOV.
The trial court found that the Brattons are not entitled to any award of damages,
particularly under Idaho Code Section 42-1207, unless the Brattons sufficiently proved that the
Scotts' actions impeded the flow of water. The trial court's ruling is against the plain language
of the state water statute, which provides in part that the impedance of flow of water in a ditch is
not the only measure of damages, but that damages may also result if the tortfeaser changes the
dominant estate's ditch. See IDAHO CODE § 42-1207.
Idaho Code Section 42-1207 acknowledges and protects separate and distinct rights:
(1) the conveyance of one's own individual water rights, and (2) a separate property interest in
the integrity of the irrigation facility and its overall flows beyond one's own, individual water
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right (known as a "ditch right"). See Savage Ditch Water Users v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 242-43
(1993) ("It is undeniable that water and ditch rights are tied together in that the ditch carries the
water. But they are not the same."); see also Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39, 47 (1951) ("[I]n
this state a ditch right for the conveyance of water is recognized as a property right apart from
and independent of the right to the use of water conveyed therein. Each may be owned, held and
conveyed independently of the other."). Consequently, one can have an injury to his or her water
rights (through impeded ditch flows), but one can also sustain a distinctly separate injury to their
ditch rights as a result of a change in the ditch or irrigation facility. This is why Idaho Code
Section 42-1207 contains the disjunctive "or" (" ... as not to impede the flow of water therein

OR to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such ditch ... "), and why the
statute requires the prior written permission of the ditch owner before a servient landowner may
alter a ditch or place the same in a pipe. The location and integrity of an irrigation ditch itself is
protected by this prior written permission requirement.
Idaho Code Section 42-1207 operates to protect not only the conveyance of water, but
also operates to protect one's property interest in the location, configuration, and integrity ofthe
existing irrigation ditch. See Savage Ditch Water Users and Simonson, supra. This is why the
Savage court made the observation that while specific ditch flow (i.e., flow impedance) evidence
would be "vital in a water rights controversy," such evidence was not the only acceptable
evidence to establish a legally cognizable injury (injury to one's ditch rights) under the statute.
[d. at 243. According to the Savage court, other forms of injury contemplated under the statute
included increased maintenance difficulty, forced use rotation, and other "inconvenience." [d.
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This case does not present a "water rights controversy," but does present a ditch right
controversy. The Brattons were not required to present evidence of impeded water flow to
prosecute their well settled ditch right. Likewise, the jury did not have to find that the Scotts'
interference with the Brattons' irrigation ditch resulted in impeded water flow in order to award
the Brattons damages as compensation for the Brattons' separate and distinct ditch rights. Under
Idaho Code Section 42-1207, the Brattons could be harmed either by an impedance in ditch
flows·OR "otherwise injured" by the Scotts' unlawful interference with their ditch rights-rights
capable of being "owned, held and conveyed independently" of their underlying water rights.

See Savage Ditch Water Users' and Simonson, supra.

4.

Damages resulted when Scots did not ohtain permission.

In addition to the fact that impedance of water flow is not the sole measure of injury or
damage under Idaho Code Section 42-1207, the jury was also equally entitled to award damages
against the Scotts for their failure to secure the Brattons' written permission prior to changing the
Brattons' irrigation ditch. The Scotts' unilateral actions amounted to negligence per se, given the
terms ofIdaho Code Section 42-1207, "must be fully complied with by one seeking to exercise
the right it confers." Simonson, 72 Idaho at 45; see also Savage Ditch Water Users, 125 Idaho at
242-43. As a result, the evidentiary burden under Idaho Code Section 42-1207 fell to the Scotts
and not the Brattons. It was the Scotts who were required to prove that they had the Brattons'
prior written permission to destroy the Brattons' irrigation ditch. Put simply, the Scotts violated
the plain terms ofIdaho Code Section 42-1207, and the jury found it appropriate to award
general damages against the Scotts for that intentional and blatant violation.
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5.

The propriety of the jury verdict.

It is well established in Idaho that the trial court should not disturb a verdict unless, as a

matter oflaw, no recovery can be made upon any view .. ,. Iverson Paints, Inc. v. Wirth Corp.,
94 Idaho 43, 480 P.2d 889 (1971) (emphasis added). In ruling on a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court may not weigh the evidence or resolve the conflict
therein or determine what conclusion should have been drawn therefrom. . . . Koser v.
Hornback, 75 Idaho 24,27,265 P.2d 988, 989 (1954); Ness v. W Coast, Inc., 90 Idaho 111

(1965). The jury had a first-hand opportunity to view the evidence as set forth in Smith v. Big
Lost River:

The members ofthe jury having had the opportunity to see all the witnesses,
observe the manner of their testimony, note their apparent candor and knowledge
of the matter concerning which they were examined, were entitled to give such
weight to the evidence introduced as in their judgment was proper.
Smith at 392.
In Idaho, the jury may base its opinion on minimal evidence and matters of common

experience if the evidence and experience is sufficient to allow for this verdict. Fouche v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 107Idaho 701, 692 P.2d 345 (1984). Therefore, in Idaho, jurors have

the right to apply their own common experience in rendering their verdict. The Idaho Supreme
Court is firmly committed to the rule that a trial court should not take a case from the jury unless,
as a matter oflaw, no recovery can be made upon any view ... Iverson Paints, Inc. v. Wirth
Corp., 94 Idaho 43, 480 P.2d 889 (1971).

Any and all damages flowing from that "harm" can reasonably be considered general
damages for which there is no neat quantitative formula for the jury to apply. See Shrum,
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Gonzales, and Bentzinger, supra. In viewing the evidence most favorable to the Brattons, the
jury's award of $4,250.00 as damages for the Scotts' failure to comply with the express language
ofIdaho Code Section 42-1207, was reasonable based on the evidence allowed by the trial court,
collective knowledge, and experience of the jury. The $2,250.00 ditch restoration-related
damage award was based on the evidence allowed by the trial court well within the purview and
general life experience (i.e., common knowledge) ofthis Canyon County, Idaho, jury. See
Quick, Smith, and Espinoza, supra. During voir dire, many members of the jury had actual
experience with digging ditches, maintaining ditches, easements, irrigation, and the operation of
large equipment.
It is common knowledge that Canyon County, Idaho, remains largely agricultural and

pastoral. As a result, many ofthe jurors had extensive first-hand knowledge of flood irrigation
practices, surface water delivery facilities, and pastures. See Quick, Smith, and Espinoza, supra.
Because jurors bring with them their general life experiences, and a corresponding sense of what
is and is not reasonable in light ofthose life experiences, they are qualified to estimate the costs
of restoring an irrigation ditch.
Given the allowed evidence on damages, the damage awards were reasonable, not
nominal, and were not of such amount to shock the consciousness. In fact, the jury awards in
this case were conservative and well within the confines ofthe allowed evidence, and based on
the jury's collective knowledge and experience.
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C.

The Trial Court Erred by Not Awarding the Brattous a New Trial.

1.

Legal standard.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) states:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues in an action for any ofthe following reasons:
1.

Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse
party or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which
either party was prevented from having a fair trial.

*
7.

*

*

Error in law, occurring at the trial.

*

*

*

(Emphasis added.) A trial court may grant a new trial even though there is substantial evidence
to support the jury's verdict. Gillingham Constr., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggens Constr., Inc., 142
Idaho 15,23,121 P.3d 946, 954 (2005) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 122 Idaho 471,
475,835 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1992». As discussed more fully below, the Brattons are entitled to a
new trial pursuant to 59(a)(I), "Irregularity in the proceedings of the court," and 59(a)(7) "Error
in law, occurring at the trial."
2.

Irregularity of the proceedings.

Rule 59(a)(I) allows in part for a new trial ifit is found that there were irregularities of
the proceeding of the Court, "[o]r any order of the Court or abuse of discretion by which the
party was prevented from having a fair trial." This trial court conducted the trial in such a
mauner as to cause great hardship for the Brattons, including, but not limited to: entering
burdensome evidentiary rulings; excluding substantial relevant evidence; advising the Brattons
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and their counsel continually from the pretrial throughout the trial that ifthey did not prevail, the
trial court would grant attorney fees to the Scotts; refusing to recognize and apply the applicable
statutes; trifurcating the trial, which caused an enormous cost to the Brattons; making confusing
and untimely rulings on the admission of evidence, which made it very difficult to put on each of .
the three segments' prima facie evidence; causing significant confusion as to the evidence
allowed in each prima facie element; and causing confusion on the part of the jury.
When evaluating whether a trial court correctly ruled on the new trial based on
irregnlarity in the proceedings merits, this Court reviews whether or not the district court took
into consideration whether the irregnlarity had any effect on the jury's decision and, if so,
whether the effect allowed for a new trial. Gillingham, 142 Idaho at 23, 121 P.3d at 954.
Furthermore, when a jury is improperly instructed, and the effect of the improper instruction has
the cumulative effect of causing the jury to reach a conclusion that is not justified, the only
conch/sion which may be drawn is that a fair and impartial trial was not had. See Griffith v.
Schmidt, 110 Idaho 235, 237-38, 715 P.2d 905, 907-08 (1986).

3.

Trifurcation.

This trifurcation ruling came asa complete surprise to the Brattons. Although the Scotts
moved for bifurcation, the trial court went beyond the Scotts' motion and, sua sponte, trifurcated
the trial, an order which the trial court admitted was unprecedented and was partially based on
the fact that the Court did not think that the Brattons would be able to make a prima facie case
for liability (second segment), and then the damage section (third segment) would not be
necessary. Further, as to the first segment, even though the trial court had ruled that the
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equitable portion of the Brattons' Complaint was now moot, the trial court empanelled an
advisory jury regarding the equitable relief, but only as to whether there existed an implied
easement under the element in Madsen. Segment number two would be liability and, if needed,
segment number three would be damages. The trifurcation order made it overly burdensome and
sent the Brattons' counsel on the eve of trial back to work to fully reorganize their case.
The trial court's basis for trifurcation was to save time; in reality, it more than doubled
the trial time, was confusing to the jury, and in violation of judicial premise of orderly and
efficient litigation. An example of confusion came during the trial when the trial court stopped
the Brattons' counsel during a witness examination to ask the jury to vote by a raise of hands
whether the offered testimony had already been heard in the first segment. This was the first
time that the Brattons' counsel was directed by the trial court that evidence in each segment
could be used in subsequent segments. After the hand vote by the jury, Brattons' counsel was
directed by the trial court to move to another subject.

4.

The trial court's Jury Instructiou No.8 was in error.

The Brattons had received a partial summary judgment of their express easement, and the
trial court had taken judicial notice ofIdaho Code Sections 42-1102, 42-1204, and 42-1207.
Idaho Code Section 42- 1102 allowed for an implied easement by operation oflaw, but the trial
court refused to apply Idaho Code Section 42-1102 and held that this statute applied only if the
easement was based on riparian rights and was trumped by case law.
The trial court based this ruling on case law cited by the Scotts; i.e., Thomas v. Madsen,
142 Idaho 635, 132 P.3d 392. The trial court ruled that Thomas v. Madsen stood for the premise
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that the Brattons must prove the elements of Madsen on implied easement, even though they had
an express irrigation easement and the rights afforded by Idaho Code Section 42-1102. The
Thomas v. Madsen case did not deal with irrigation or Idaho Code Section 42-1102, but rather

dealt with a driveway dispute. The Brattons argued that Madsen did not preempt application of
Idaho Code Section 42-1102, but rather was inapplicable because of the express irrigation
easement and the State ofIdaho irrigation statutes. Based on the trial court rulings regarding the
inapplicability of Idaho Code Section 42-1102, the jury's instruction No.8 is the correct law of
the state ofIdaho:

INSTRUCTION NO.8
Plaintiffs claim that they have an implied easement over Defendants' property
based upon prior use. In order to establish an implied easement by prior use,
Plaintiffs must prove the following three elements:
(1)
Unity oftitle or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of
the dominant estate;
(2)
Apparent continuous use long enough before conveyance of the
dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and
(3)
That the easement is reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment
ofthe dominant estate.
Of note, the same jury deciding segment one would be the jury that would decide the
remaining two segments. Because the jury was to take each segment and all of the jury
instructions into consideration when deciding all subsequent segments, the improper instructions
in the first segment impacted the view of the state of the law for the jury in all of the segments.
The Idaho appellate courts have long held that the giving of an incorrect instruction
constitutes "such irregularity and error in law as to bring the case within Rule 59(a)." Walton v.
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Potlatch Corp., 116 Idaho 892, 897, 781 P.2d 229, 234 (1989). In fact, when a jury verdict is
. rendered "on the basis of incorrect instructions, the appropriate remedy is the granting of a new
trial." Walton, 116 Idaho at 234. See also, Corey v. Wilson, 93 Idaho 54, 454 P.2d 951 (1969);
Walker v. Distler, 78 Idaho 38, 296 P.2d 452 (1956). Finally, the Supreme Court ofIdaho held
some 30 years ago that "[t]he trial court is under a duty to instruct the jury on every reasonable
theory recognized by law that is supported at trial." Everton v. Blair, 99 Idaho 14,576 P.2d 585
(1978)(citing Hodge v. Borden, 91 Idaho 125,417 P.2d 75 (1966); Domingo v. Phillips, 87
Idaho 55, 390 P.2d 297 (1964); Wurm v. Pulice, 82 Idaho 359, 353 P.2d 1071 (1960». In fact,
the trial court "has a duty to grant a new trial where prejudicial errors oflaw have occurred at the
trial, even though the verdict ofthe jury is supported by substantial evidence." Sherwood v.
Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 262, 805 P.2d 452, 468 (1991) (citing Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95
Idaho 732, 518 P.2d 1194 (1974».
Instructing on Idaho Code Section 42-1102 was fundamental to the Brattons' lawsuit, and
instructing the jury with an incorrect statement of the law was a requirement that the Brattons
could not overcome. This irregularity of the trial court permanently and unfairly led the jury to
decide the full matter using an incorrect instruction on the law of irrigation easements.
5.

Impediment of flow is not required for damage award.

The law clearly states that the Brattons could suffer harm or injury by a "change of the
ditch Q!: impediment of flow." See IDAHO CODE § 42-1207 (emphasis added). The Brattons met
the burden that the Scotts changed the ditch. The trial court nevertheless disagreed with the
express language ofIdaho Code Section 42-1207, and refused to recognize the word "or" in the
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statute. Instead, the trial court ruled that both elements were required and thus gave an
instruction that required the jury to answer a separate question as to whether there was
impediment of flow. The trial court then utilized that specific special verdict question regarding
impediment of flow to deny most of the Brattons' damage evidence. This action by the court
was an abuse of discretion and was instrumental in preventing a fair trial.
As noted above, when a verdict is rendered on the basis ofincorrect instructions, the
appropriate remedy is the granting of a new trial. See Walton, supra. Furthermore, because of
the replication ofthe fundamental error in the court's jury instruction, there was a "cumulative
effect" that certainly caused the jury to reach an unjustified conclusion. As such, "a fair and
impartial trial was not had." Griffith, 110 Idaho at 238.

6.

Trial conrt's warning on attorney fees.

The trial court, both on the record, in chambers, and offthe record, warned the Brattons
and their attorneys that if they did not prevail or if the award was nominal, then the trial court
would award attorney fees to the Scotts. The trial court did not cite the basis of allowing for
fees. This case was not an attorney fee matter in that there is no statutory basis for fees, and the
case certainly was not brought on a frivolous basis. The trial court abused its discretion by
continually warning that it would award attorney fees against the Brattons if they did not prevail
or if the damages were decided by the trial court to be nominal.

7.

Exclusion of plaintiffs evidence.

Based on the trial court's misinterpretation of the law with respect to irrigation
easements, it excluded and limited a substantial portion of the Brattons' damages. The list of
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exclusions set forth below is not meant to be a complete list, but is set forth to show the
substantial nature ofthe Brattons' evidence that the trial court ruled inadmissible.

a.

Evidence was excluded of crop loss and consequences.

Because the trial court misinterpreted the Idaho statutes on easements, specifically Idaho
Code Section 42-1207, the trial court ruled that crop loss and consequences thereof would be
excluded and based that ruling on the fact that the jury found no impediment of flow. Again, the
Brattons argued that the statute, Idaho Code Section 42-1207, allowed for harm, without
limitation, to the Brattons if there was impediment of flow OR if the ditch was changed.
The trial court would not allow a special verdict question on whether the Scotts destroyed
the Brattons' ditch, but rather would only allow the question of whether the Scotts changed the
ditch. The jury found that the Scotts had violated the law by changing the ditch without written
permission and that the change caused interference and that interference caused harm to the
Brattons. Following the trial court's ruling excluding substantial crop loss damage, the Brattons
made an offer of proof to include evidence of expert testimony, actual loss, and actual
consequences ofthe injury proximately caused by the Scotts' actions. The crop loss and
consequence thereto was the Brattons' largest element of damage, and by excluding all evidence
pertaining thereto, the trial court in effect denied the Brattons their right to a fair and impartial
jury trial. The trial court based all rulings on a misinterpretation of the statutory law regarding
easements/right-of-ways, and that misapplication caused numerous errors. Since the trial court
would not recognize that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 was controlling in this matter, and since
the trial court found that Idaho Code Sections 42-1204 and 1207 only allowed damage to the
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claimants' estate if flow was impeded, the judge's ruling on exclusion of damages was
fundamentally flawed. The trial court clearly abused its discretion in the above-listed rulings
against the Brattons.

h.

Evidence was excluded on replacement of tiled ditch.

The trial court clearly and uufairly restricted the Brattons as to their damage evidence.
First, based on the interpretation ofIdaho Code Section 42-1207, in which the trial court ruled
that impediment of flow was required to allow damages of anything other than replacing an
aboveground ditch, the trial court .excluded all ofthe Brattons' evidence as to the cost of
replacing the tiled ditch. The whole case had been pled, discovered, and depositions had been
taken with the premise that the Brattons were seeking damages to install an uudergrouud system.
The trial court ruled that this evidence was excluded.

D.

Jndgment for Costs, Discretionary Costs, and Attorney Fees.

The Scotts did not meet the requirements of the cited statutes and rules in their motion for
costs, disbursements, and attorney fees and, therefore, the trial court erred in awarding such costs
and fees.

1.

The Scotts are not the prevailing party.

In the case on review, the Scotts' award of JNOV did not disturb the uuanimous special

verdict questions in favor of the Brattons on liability (second segment). Under Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 54, costs as a matter of right may be awarded to the "prevailing party." Initially,
it is important to note that legal proceedings often fail to yield a wholly prevailing party, and
there should be no award if the court determines that neither side prevailed. Owner-Operator
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Indep. Drivers Ass 'n v. Idaho Pub. Uti!. Comm 'n, 125 Idaho 401, 407 (1984). Similarly, ifboth

parties have prevailed in part, the court may exercise its discretion to decline the award of costs
to either party. Burnham v. Bray, 104 Idaho 550,554-55 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added). For
its part, Rule 54 provides:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court in
its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and
did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and
among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all ofthe issues
and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained. (Emphasis added.)
LR.C.P.54(d)(1)(B).
A determination that a party has prevailed "is a matter committed to the sound discretion
ofthe trial court." J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'l, Inc., 130 Idaho 255 (1997). However, the
court of appeals has laid out a three-part inquiry to aid the trial court in its determination of the
prevailing party: "The court must examine (1) the result obtained in relation to the relief sought;
(2) whether there were multiple claims or issues; and (3) the extent to which either party
prevailed on each issue or claim." Jerry J. Joseph C.L. u., Ins. Assocs., Inc. v. Vaught, 117

Idaho 555, 557 (Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). See Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho
687,692 (Ct. App. 1984) (dismissal ofa claim and when dismissal occurred were two of many
factors considered in making a prevailing party determination).
Although the trial court has the discretion to find that a party "prevailed in part and did
not prevail in part," it is also clear that the court is not "compelled to make a discrete award of
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costs on each claim." Id. at 693. Instead, applicable precedent instructs ''the total defense of a
party's proceedings must be unreasonable or frivolous." Magic Valley v. Prof,! Bus. Servs., 119
Idaho 558, 563 (1991) (emphasis added). See also Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N. Pac. Ins. Co.,
145 Idaho 241,178 P.3d 606 (2008) ("I.e. § 12-121 applies to the case as a whole. Where there
are multiple claims and defenses, it is not appropriate to segregate those claims and defenses for
purposes of awarding costs and fees under I.C. § 12-121.") (internal citations omitted). There
was no overall prevailing party in the matter. See Int'l Eng 'g Co. v. Daum Indus. Inc., 102 Idaho
363, 367 (1984) (even where plaintiff prevailed on several counts and defendant prevailed on
only one issue, this Court did not disturb the trial court's determination that there was not a
prevailing party). Given that this litigation was not "entirely favorable" to the Scotts, the Scotts
are not the prevailing party and should not be awarded their claimed costs, and certainly not their
discretionary costs and attorney fees. At most, the trial court can only find that the Scotts
"prevailed in part and did not prevail in part." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1)(B) Even if the trial
court did so find that both parties prevailed in part, the results of the verdict were mixed, and an
award of costs, discretionary costs, and attorney fees to the Scotts is not appropriate.

2.

Plaintiffs' action was not frivolous or without foundation.

As to attorney fees, Idaho courts follow the American Rule on the question of awards of
attorney fees, which provides that "attorney fees are to be awarded only where they are
authorized by statute or contract." Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571 (1984). Consequently, a
party must provide legal authority supporting a fee request. MDS Invs., L.L. C. v. State, 138
Idaho 456 (2003). Rule 54 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Idaho Code Sections 10-1210,
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12-120, and 12-121 do not support the claim since the case was not brought frivolously, is not
the subject of a commercial transaction, and there was never a hearing afforded by the trial court
or given to Brattons' claim of equitable relief.
Under Idaho Code Section 12-121, the Scotts may only recover their attorney fees if the
trial court determined that the Brattons' action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation. Even if the trial court was persuaded that the Scotts were the prevailing party,
Rule 54(e)(l) lirnitsthe award of attorney fees to a prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 12-121 to circumstances where "the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(I); Seiniger, 145 Idaho at 215, 178 P.3d at
616 (2008). In making such a determination, "[ t]he sole question is whether the losing party's
position is so plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation."

Severson v. Hermann, 116 Idaho 497, 498 (1989). Even though the trial court is afforded broad
discretion, it must make a "specific finding ... supported by the record." ld. See also Black v.

Young, 122 Idaho 302, 310 (1992) (acknowledging discretion of the court to make an award, but
noting that an award is improper ''where the record itself discloses" the reasonableness of a claim
or defense); J.MF. Trucking v. Carburetor & Elec. ofLewiston, 113 Idaho 797, 799 (1987)
(overturning trial court's award offees as arbitrary and inconsistent because it denied a motion to
dismiss a claim because of reasonable factual conflicts on the record and subsequently granted
attorney fees on grounds that the same claim was frivolously or unreasonably pursued). In this
case, the record very clearly discloses that the Brattons' case was necessary and reasonable; it
was not brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Further, the Brattons
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prevailed as to liability, which unanimous verdict remained undisturbed by the trial court's grant
of Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict to Defendants.

3.

Brattons' claim was based on Idaho statutes.

In light of the fact that the Brattons presented a statutory basis for their Complaint, and
the fact that the trial court had to resort to the canons of statutory construction to resolve the
applicability of the statute, the Brattons' Complaint did not justify an award of attorney fees to
the Scotts. Although the trial court is afforded broad discretion to award attorneys fees, it was
reversible error to do so in these circumstances. The record clearly indicates that the Brattons
reasonably pursued this complaint, which was well founded and based on the statutes of the state
of Idaho. The record shows that the jury found unanimously in favor of the Brattons as to
liability and injury.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the facts presented at trial and the clear statutory law controlling long-standing
irrigation ditches, easements, and rights-of-way, Appellants respectfully request that the
judgment n.o.v. and that the costs and fees awarded to the Scotts be vacated and that the Motion
for New Trial be granted.
DATED this /u..J<-. day of February, 2010.
MOFFAIT, THOMAS, BARREIT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

J. Garrett - Of the Firm
iwr~ys for Appellants
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